The Informer Privilege in Criminal Prosecutions by Rosenthal, Herbert M.
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 11 | Issue 1 Article 4
1-1959
The Informer Privilege in Criminal Prosecutions
Herbert M. Rosenthal
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.
Recommended Citation
Herbert M. Rosenthal, The Informer Privilege in Criminal Prosecutions, 11 Hastings L.J. 54 (1959).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol11/iss1/4
COMMENT
THE INFORMER PRIVILEGE IN CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS
By HERBERT M. ROSENTHAL*
Introductiou
The defendant is on trial charged with the sale of narcotics. The prose-
cution's only eye witness, Officer Woodlow of the San Francisco Police
Department, has just testified on direct examination that he had witnessed,
from a secret vantage point, the sale of narcotics by the defendant to one
John Doe, an unnamed informer. Counsel for the defense has resumed the
questioning of the officer on cross-examination.
Q. "You observed defendant making a sale to another person?"
A. "Yes."
Q. "What is the name of that person?"
A. "I am not at liberty to reveal that information."
Q. "What is his name?"
The prosecuting attorney: "I object your honor to this line of ques-
tioning. The government has properly, through the witness, invoked its
privilege of nondisclosure of an informer's identity. The public interest in
efficient law enforcement dictates that this privilege be preserved regardless
of the informer's relevancy to the evidence before the court."
Counsel for the defense: "Your honor, public policy dictates that the
accused's right to a complete cross-examination of the evidence presented
against him be preserved. The identity of the informer is highly relevant
to the issue of the guilt or innocence of the defendant. The defendant
denies that he made a sale of narcotics at the location and at the time
specified by the witness. Defendant has no fair opportunity to substantiate
his denial and impeach the testimony of the officer without disclosure of
the informer's identity. If there is disclosure, the informer after being com-
pelled to appear here might testify that no such sale was made, or that it
was not the defendant who received narcotics, or that there was an
entrapment."
The government has a privilege to keep the informer's identity a secret,
but as in the hypothetical situation this secrecy may run counter to the
rights of the defendant. Since the government prosecutes an accused it is
unconscionable to allow it to undertake prosecution and then invoke its
governmental privilege to deprive the accused of anything which might be
material to his defense.
Two courses are available to the court by which to secure a fair hear-
ing. The trial judge can require and compel the government's witness to
disclose the informer's identity. Or the court can request the identity and,
if such is refused, exclude all prior testimony of the witness. The very
nature of the informer privilege dictates that the last alternative is the
wisest.
* Member, third-year class.
The Nature of the Privilege
Through the centuries the flow of communications from informers has
proven vital to the detection of criminal activities. During the feudal period
in England, before the organization of law enforcement agencies, informa-
tion from informers was used to bring violators to the bar of justice.1 Such
information was later solicited by rewards, a practice which has survived
to the present.2
The organization of law enforcement agencies did not in any way depre-
ciate the usefulness of the informer. Today the police depend almost
entirely on informers in the enforcement of sumptuary laws such as those
directed against gambling, prostitution, or the illegal sale and use of liquors
and narcotics.3
The best illustration of the effective use of informers is in narcotic
offenses. The illegal sale or possession of narcotics is conducted with the
greatest of secrecy. The contraband does not remain long in any one place.
Knowledge of its presence at a particular place and time usually must stem
from informers.
English and American courts often ascribed the public interest to the
protection of the informer from reprisals in order to encourage him to do
his duty or exercise his right as a citizen to report violations of the law to
the proper government officials.
Courts declared that every citizen had the duty to communicate to his
government any information which he had of the commission of an offense
against the laws. Thus, in order to encourage him to perform his duty with-
out fear of "evil consequences,"4 it was declared that his identity was
among the secrets of state.5
The United States Supreme Court declared on one occasion that it is
a right as well as the duty of every citizen to report violations of the law
to the proper authorities.6 This right was said to arise from the very estab-
lishment of government. In order to secure the right the informer must be
protected. Therefore public interest favored keeping the informer's identity
a secret.
Today, the "duty" and "right" concepts are recognized as merely inci-
dental to the true underlying purpose of the privilege. The privilege recog-
nizes that a person may fear to cooperate in the administration of justice
if he knows that his identity will be made public. But the informer is made
secure only as an incident to the furtherance of the public interest in
1 See 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES § 330 for a discussion on the practice of approvement.
2 Some federal statutes award informers a share of fines. See 38 STAT. 277 (1914), 21
U.S.C. 183 (1952). However, the majority of payments are made by officers out of the police
department's budget.
3 See VOLTMER, THE POLICE AND MODERN SocIET " 81 (1936).4 United States v. Rogers, 53 F.2d 874, 876 (S.D. N.J. 1931).
5 Worthington v. Scribner, 109 Mass. 487, 488 (1872).
6 In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532 (1894).
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promoting the flow of such information to establish more efficient law
enforcement.
7
Some courts have declared that before the privilege can be invoked
the trial court must determine whether the public interest would suffer by
disclosure.' This question is not for the court to determine as the basis of
the privilege is the public interest.
However, the court should, as in all evidentiary matters, determine
whether the requisite elements of the privilege are fulfilled and the court
should do so without forcing a disclosure of the very thing that the privilege
is designed to protect. Unlike military secrets9 there is no reason why the
judge in his chambers should not be given the informer's identity. No
matter how vital informers are to the enforcement of law it would be
ludicrous to contend that a judge who sits as the keeper and preserver of
the law is incompetent to be trusted with the identity of the informer.
The common law privilege only applies to the identity of persons who
furnish information of violations of law to public officers charged with
the enforcement of that law.10 The privilege does not extend to the contents
of the informer's statement." In some instances the communications them-
selves will fall within the privilege but only because the identity of the
informer is in jeopardy by disclosure of that information. 2
7 Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1956).
8 People v. McShann, 50 Cal. 2d 802, 807, 330 P.2d 33, 35 (1958). This is an unnecessary
literal interpretation of CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1881(5) which declares, "a public officer cannot
be examined as to communications made to him in official confidence, when the public interest
would suffer by disclosure." It is apparent that subdivision five does not specifically apply to
the government's privilege of nondisclosure of an informer's identity. Subdivision five applies
to any "confidential communication" received by a public officer. Whether the communications
are from a disclosed or undisclosed source is immaterial. However, the courts in California
have utilized this code section as the statutory safeguard of the common law informer
privilege.
9 See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953). The United States Supreme Court
had to determine whether the government had made a proper claim of privilege against dis-
closure of military secrets. The court said that some formula of compromise must be applied
as judicial control over the evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the caprice of executive
officers. Yet the court was unwilling to go so far as to say that there should be an automatic
requirement of complete disclosure to the judge in his chambers before the claim of privilege
could be accepted.
-0 People v. Keating, 286 App. Div. 150, 141 N.Y.S. 2d 562 (1955). The government's
witness who acquired information from informers while engaged by a voluntary and private
agency in aiding in the enforcement of criminal laws was not allowed to withhold the
identities as he was not a public officer. The privilege applies to the identity of those who
communicate only to such public officers as have a responsibility or duty to investigate or to
prevent public wrongs, and not to officials in general. But Professor Wigmore says that the
principle is a flexible one: "[I]t applies wherever the situation is one where without this
encouragement the citizens who have special information of a violation of law might be
deterred otherwise from voluntarily reporting it to the appropriate officials." 8 WIGMoR,
EVIDENCE § 2374 (3d ed. 1940).
11 8 WIGmoRE, EvIDENCE § 2374 (3d ed. 1940). Other government privileges shield the
communication because the communication is directly vital to the national or public security.
But in order to encourage communications of law violations it is the source of the communica-
tions which should be protected rather than the communications themselves. Contra: Michael
v. Matson, 81 Kan. 360, 105 Pac. 537 (1909); People v. Roban, 45 N.Y.S. 2d 213 (1943). See
9 A.L.R. 1112; 59 A.L.R. 1559.
12 Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 214, 221 (1950).
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The informer has no power to compel the government to invoke the
privilege. The fate of his identity is solely in the hands of the government.3
Like all privileges it may be waived by the holder.
This evidentiary privilege is available to the government in a criminal
or civil suit and may be invoked in order to prevent any witness who
appears for either party from disclosing an informer's identity.'4 The privi-
lege cannot be invoked if the identity of the informer is known to those
who have cause to resent the communications. 5 However, some courts
have indicated that an accused who knows the identity of the informer
will not ordinarily be prejudiced by the trial court's failure to require
disclosure.'
In most jurisdictions the trial court need not determine the validity of
the government's claim of privilege if the accused falls to make a proper
demand at the trial for disclosure. 1
The applicability of the privilege is independent of the informer's moti-
vations. Whether he acts from motives of good citizenship, under a promise
of immunity, for hire, or otherwise is immaterial.' So too, in civil suits the
privilege is applicable regardless of the probative value of the informer's
possible testimony.' 9
Participant-Informer Rule
Today many courts and writers persist in exhortation that there is no
informer privilege if disclosure of the informer's identity is relevant and
helpful to the defense of the accused or in criminal proceedings if it is
13 Worthington v. Scribner, 109 Mass. 487 (1872). But see Wells v. Toogood, 165 Mich.
677, 131 N.W. 124 (1911). The court failed to distinguish that the government is the sole
holder of the privilege. Plaintiff brought action for slander against an alleged informer. When
an officer was asked as to the complaint of theft made to him by the informer, defendant's
counsel objected on the basis of the informer privilege. The trial court sustained the objection
which was upheld on appeal. The government was not a party to this suit and had no repre-
sentative present except the officer. It does not appear that the officer was aware of the
privilege or had been advised by his superiors. Professor McCormick suggests that the trial
judge may invoke the privilege for the absent holder. McCoRMICK, EvmimcF § 148 (1954).
14 8 Wioox, EvIDENcE § 2374 n. 1 (3d ed. 1940).
15 Pihl v. Morris, 319 Mass. 57, 66 N.E.2d 804 (1946).
16 Sorrentino v. United States, 163 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1947). See note 8 supra.
17 United States v. Conforti, 200 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1952) ; McCoy v. State, 216 Md. 332,
140 A.2d 689 (1958).
I8 Usually the police do not depend on the ordinary citizen for information of law viola-
tions. The bulk of informers are actually cultivated by the police among the less desirable ele-
ments of society who have already acquired positions in the inderworld. In many instances the
informers are criminal violators themselves who trade information for rewards or for immunity
from prosecution. See VoILMR, THE PoLicE AND MoDEmr SociErY 81 (1936). This introduces
an interesting question: must the communications be made by such persons honestly and not
maliciously in order to merit the government invoking the privilege? How would the govern-
ment be able to prove whether the informer's intentions were honestly motivated without
revealing the informer or dragging the trial out on a side issue? See Ex Parte Farrell, 189 F.2d
54 (1st Cir. 1951); Takahashi v. Hecht Co., S0 F.2d 326 (DJD.C. 1931).
39 American Surety Co. v. Pryor, 217 Ala. 244, 115 So. 176 (1927).
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essential to a fair determination of a cause.2" This is the prevailing dictum
in the United States but not the prevailing case law.
The confusion on this point can be traced to the days when the privilege
was first developed. The courts upheld the privilege but at the same time
allowed the prosecution to utilize the evidence of the witness, the whole
of which was dependent on the informer.2
The effect here was that the government's evidence remained before the
trial court while the defendant was denied his only means to refute or im-
peach it. If the evidence introduced by the witness was neither material nor
prejudicial to the issue before the court no harm was done, but if this
evidence was vital to the proof of the accused's guilt then the prose-
cution's nondisclosure served as a denial of the defendant's right to cross-
examination.
As the courts in England and the United States became more aware of
the accused's procedural and constitutional rights in criminal trials, the
courts began to recognize the problem. But, instead of dealing with the
evidence, the courts attacked the privilege. Lord Esher suggested that:'
[I] f upon the trial of a prisoner the judge should be of the opinion that
the disclosure of the name of the informant is necessary or right in order
to show the prisoner's innocence, then one public policy is in conflict with
another public policy, and that which says that an innocent man is not to
be condemned when his innocence can be proved is the policy that must
prevail.
In response to Lord Esher's suggestion several American courts adopted
the "participant-informer" rule.2 As Lord Esher contemplated, the rule
would demand disclosure where the informer is a material witness on the
issue of guilt or innocence. However, the rule has been applied only where
the informer is a participant in a criminal act charged to the defendant.
For example, the defendant is accused of making an unlawful sale of
narcotics to an unnamed person. The person to whom the defendant sup-
posedly made the sale is a "participant-informer."
The courts have held that a "participant-informer" is no longer simply
an informer. He is said to be a police decoy who is a material witness to
the unlawful transaction and thus vitally necessary for the defense of the
accused.' At least one court has declared that the defendant cannot be
denied the right to ascertain the "participant-informer's" identity without
suppressing an element of the res gestae.25
In effect the "participant-informer" rule limits the applicability of the
informer privilege to criminal cases where a non-participant informer is
20See notes 7 and 8 supra; 8 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 2374 (3d ed. 1940); McCoRMcK,
EVIDENCE § 148 (1954).
21 Rex v. Hardy, 24 Howell's State Trials 199 (1794).
2 2 Marks v. Beyfus, 25 Q.B.D. 494, 498 (1890).
23 Crosby v. State, 90 Ga. App. 63, 82 S.E.2d 38 (1954).
24 Ibid.2 5 People v. Lawrence, 149 Cal. App. 2d 435, 308 P.2d 821 (1957).
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involved. Such a restriction ignores the very nature of the privilege. The
common law privilege made no distinction between an informer who is
involved in the crime and an informer who merely points the finger of
suspicion. The public interest will suffer by disclosure of any informer
regardless of his participation in the unlawful transaction charged to the
accused.
The courts which use the "participant-informer" rule allow both the
privilege and the evidence in a non-participant situation." Thus in applica-
tion of the rule the court not only ignores the very nature of the privilege
but also does nothing to protect the defendant's rights where the non-
participant informer is a material witness. For example, the defendant is
charged with the unlawful possession of narcotics. The informer was the
only eye-witness to the search other than the defendant and the arresting
officer. The testimony of the arresting officer is more likely to be believed
by the jury than the testimony of the defendant. Only the informer's
testimony can reveal whether the officer's evidence is fabricated. Under
these circumstances the "participant-informer" rule which requires dis-
closure of the informer has no application as the informer is not a partici-
pant in the felonious transaction. Thus the court allows the prosecution to
invoke the informer privilege, and the court will not exclude the officer's
allegation. Hence the government is allowed to utilize its evidence while
holding back the only substantial means available to the defendant for
rebuttal.
The Modern Rule
A modern rule has been adopted by the Supreme Court of the United
States27 and by the Supreme Court of California.' The modern rule
remedies the weaknesses of the "informer-participant" rule but, in turn, is
open to other criticism. The Supreme Court announced in Roviaro v. United
States29 that an absolute rule cannot be applied in determining the in-
former's relevancy to the issue before the court.
In determining the informer's relevancy the trial court must take into
consideration all of the circumstances, such as: the crime charged, the
significance of the testimony of the prosecution's witnesses, whether the
informer was known to the accused, the possible defenses, and the possible
significance of the informer's testimony. The fact that the informer has
participated in the crime for which the defendant is charged is merely an
additional factor for consideration."
2 6 This is stated affirmatively. Even though the courts applying the informer-participant
rule also declared that disclosure would be required where a non-participant was a "material"
witness the courts were always able to ignore such situations. See People v. Gonzales, 136 Cal.
App. 2d 437, 288 P.2d 588 (1955); Prown v. State, 135 Tex. Cr. R. 394, 120 S.W.2d 1057
(1938) ; State v. Hull, 189 Wash. 174, 64 P.2d 83 (1937).
27 See note 7 supra.
28 See note 8 supra.
29 353 U.S. 53 (1956).
o Ibid.
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Unfortunately, the courts, in applying this totality-of-the-circumstances
test, designate as error the trial court's failure to require disclosure." This
has lent itself to the popular legal belief that the privilege gives way where,
under the circumstances, the informer is material to the defense of the
accused. But the word "require" as analyzed within the context of the
cases means only to "request." Actually, the error under this view is the
failure of the trial court to dismiss the prosecution's case when the prosecu-
tion ignores the trial court's request for disclosure.2
In People v. McShann3 the California court adopted the modern rule
promulgated by the United States Supreme Court. The defendant was
convicted on a second count of unlawful possession of narcotics. The
prosecution introduced the testimony of the arresting officers on the issues
of the defendant's possession of heroin and his admissions of guilt. This
evidence of itself was enough to convict the defendant. However, the
prosecution also chose to introduce as evidence telephone conversations
between the informer and the defendant in order to buttress the govern-
ment's proof of the guilty knowledge necessary for the crime. The defend-
ant asked for disclosure of the informer's identity. The trial court, relying
on the "participant-informer" rule, allowed the government's privilege and
the evidence.
The California Supreme Court properly discerned that the informer,
as originator of the telephone call, was a material witness on the issue of
possession. The court ordered reversal and assigned as error the failure
of the trial court to require disclosure. However, specific instructions were
given to the trial court on how to deal with such a situation.
The instructions given truly characterize the modern rule. The trial
court is admonished not to require disclosure of the identity of the informer
if the government elects to invoke its evidentiary privilege. Instead the
trial court should dismiss the prosecution's case.34 Therefore if the prosecu-
tion elects to invoke the privilege it does so at the expense of incurring a
dismissal.34a
The burden is placed on the prosecution and not upon the trial court to
decide whether the public prejudice of allowing the crime to go unpunished
is greater than that attendant upon the possible disclosure of the informer's
identity. The public interest dictates that the prosecution of law violators
and the informer privilege are the responsibilities of the government. The
31 See notes 7 and 8 supra.
3 2 Ibid.
33 50 Cal. 2d 802, 330 P.2d 33 (1958).
34 The United States Supreme Court has indicated that the same policy will apply in
criminal cases where the government invokes its other evidentiary privileges so depriving the
defendant of an opportunity to defend himself. See United States v. Jencks, 353 U.S. 657
(1956) ; United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1952).
34a An interesting question arises where the government does reveal the identity of the
informer but the informer has disappeared. Is the trial court still obligated to dismiss the
prosecution's case? And, how much is necessary for a complete identification? See People v.
Valencia, 156 Cal. App. 2d 337, 341, 342, 319 P.2d 377, 379 (1958).
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government exercises a power of waiver over both. The final election of
whether one or the other should prevail is properly left to the state.
This "election" doctrine can actually result in placing an unnecessary
burden on the prosecution. For instance, in the McSkann case there was
evidence, aside from the telephone conversation, sufficient of itself to
sustain a conviction. In- such a case the defendant's rights are adequately
protected merely by exclusion of the telephone conversations. The court
should dismiss the prosecution's case only where the remaining evidence
is insufficient to sustain a conviction.
Reasonable Cause for Arrest and Search
In many jurisdictions evidence obtained by an illegal search and seizure
cannot be used to obtain a conviction in a criminal trial. The federal courts
have adopted this procedure to safeguard an individual's right to privacy
under the fourth amendment.3 5 Although not required by the fourteenth
amendment,36 an increasing minority of the states are adopting this rule.37
A law enforcement officer can make a lawful search for and seizure of
evidence in two general situations: (1) when he is possessed of a valid
search warrant previously issued authorizing the search and seizure, or (2)
without a search warrant as an incident to a lawful arrest.
A lawful arrest may be made either under the authority of a warrant
of arrest in possession of the officer, or without such a warrant upon a
showing of probable or reasonable cause 3s
Here again, then, is the situation where the informer privilege may
come into conflict with the defendant's rights. If the officer has acted
entirely or substantially on information provided by an informer, the
informer is certainly material to any proof of reasonable cause.39
35 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
36 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
3 7 M cCoRmcx, EVIDENCE § 139 n. 7 (1954). California has adopted this rule in People v.
Caban, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).3 8 People v. Dupee 151 Cal. App. 2d 364, 311 P.2d 568 (1957). But see RESTATEmNT,
TORTS § 119 (G) (1934). (At common law the officer did not have to justify his grounds for
arrest if the person arrested had in fact committed a felony. The officer's arrest was deemed
lawful, therefore the incidental search would be reasonable. If the officer arrested the wrong
person then he was allowed to show reasonable cause for the arrest as a defense to a civil suit.)
39 Reasonable cause may be established solely on the officer's own investigation after acting
on a tip from the informer. The informer is not material when the officer has acted on what
he himself saw. Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938). The reasoning is that the
informer acts merely as a "tipster" who arouses a suspicion in the officer. However, the officer
acting on this suspicion needs far less observation to satisfy his own belief that defendant is
committing a felony or has committed a felony than would be true if he had acted on impulse.
The officer need only show for the purpose of satisfying reasonable cause that he acted as the
reasonable person would under the circumstances at the time. See Willson v. Superior Court,
46 Cal. 2d 291, 294 P.2d 36 (1957). There, officers received information from an anonymous
source that defendant was bookmaking. The officers then went to the cafe-bar where the
defendant was working as a waitress. Defendant was previously unknown to the officers and
had no prior record as a suspect. Defendant was observed writing on a pad while conducting a
telephone conversation. Defendant matched the description given by the informer. The officers
watched the defendant for awhile and then arrested her. The subsequent search revealed that
she was taking bets. Prior to the arrest they did not overhear the telephone conversations or
see what the defendant was writing down. Certainly, of itself, defendant's conduct was not
enough to arouse a reasonable quspicion. The court held that the officers had satisfied reasonable
cause to act on their "own observations" for the arrest and search.
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On January second, X, who is regarded by the police as a reliable
informer, communicates to the police that D was in possession of narcotics
on January first. With directions from X, the officers drive out to D's
residence. The officers conduct no prior investigation but arrest D and
search his person. The arrest and search are without warrants. The search
results in a finding and seizure of narcotics. As a result ID is indicted for
the illegal possession of narcotics. The informer is in no way relevant to
the guilt or innocence of the defendant. X was not a participant or witness
to the unlawful possession. He merely pointed the finger of suspicion at D.
In the example given, to show the legality of the officer's arrest either
the informer must be brought forward or the court must accept the hearsay
declarations of the officers.
Courts have allowed hearsay evidence. Some courts base the test of
probable or reasonable cause on whether the officer has relied on informa-
tion from a "reliable" informer." A reliable informer is one who has sup-
plied the authorities with accurate information on prior occasions. The
officer may establish reliability by evidence other than by production of
the informer. Thus there is no way to prove whether or not the communica-
tion was actually made. And therefore, reasonable cause is made to rest on
the assumption that an officer is honest. But this is only an assumption and
without the informer the defendant has no way to rebutt it.
Properly, within many jurisdictions the defendant's right to cross-
examination applies to this collateral cause as much as it does to the issue
of guilt or innocence.41 But some unnecessarily attack the informer privi-
lege in order to guarantee the defendant's rights.42 The privilege is forced
to give way and the witness is compelled over the objection of the govern-
ment to disclose the identity of the informer.43
Other courts have discerned that the privilege is to be preserved. These
40 United States v. Li Fat Tong, 152 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1945).
4 1 United States v. Keown, 19 F. Supp. 639 (S.D. Ky. 1937).
42 Hill v. State, 151 Miss. 518, 118 So. 539 (1928).
43 Wilson v. United States, 59 F.2d 390 (3d Cir. 1932). (This was a rare case where the
peculiar question of contempt was involved. Prohibition officer refused to reveal the identity
of the person on whose information he acted for search and seizure. The trial court held the
officer in contempt and the circuit court of appeal affirmed). This case raises a very important
question: Does the court have the jurisdiction to compel a witness who is an employee or
executive officer of the government to reveal information which the government has classified
as secret ?
Congressional legislation casts a shadow on whether the federal courts can require a
witness who is a government agent to disclose the identity of an informer. Rxv. STAT. § 161
(1872), 5 U.S.C. § 22 (1952). Cf. U.S. ex rel. Touchy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462 (1957). (Pursuant
to Department of Justice Order No. 3229, issued by the Attorney General under 5 U.S.C. § 22,
a subordinate official of the Department of Justice refused, in a habeas corpus proceeding by a
state prisoner, to obey a subpoena duces tecum requiring him to produce papers of the Depart-
ment in his possession. Held: Order No. 3229 is valid and the subordinate official properly
refused to produce the papers.) But Cf.: State ex rel. State v. Church 35 Wash. 170, 211 P.2d
701 (1949). (In face of a state statute prohibiting disclosure of certain information from
social security and county welfare department records, the court held that the county welfare
department administrator was not immune from obeying a court order to produce secret
departmental documents). See also Mitchell v. Roma, 22 F.R.D. 217 (S.D. Pa. 1958).
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courts do not require disclosure but strike the testimony relating to the
communications from the informer.44 Of course, this may operate to defeat
the prosecution's proof of reasonable cause, but the election properly rests
on the government to determine whether prosecution of its case against the
defendant is less important than waiver of its evidentiary privilege.
A Rule of Exclusion
The hypothetical situation which appears in the introduction left the
trial court with two alternatives by which to secure a fair hearing. The
trial court could require the government's witness to disclose the informer's
identity. Or the court could request the identity and, if such was refused,
exclude all prior testimony of the witness.
The trial court may determine whether the requisite elements of the
privilege are present for its invocation, but adopting a strict disclosure
rule as suggested by Lord Esher the trial court will exceed the limits of its
judicial authority. The privilege is embedded in the public interest and
operates to keep the informer's identity outside the purview of judicial
interrogation. If the privilege is to give way it should only do so because
of the government's waiver.
But the informer privilege was not designed to allow the prosecution
to withhold the informer's identity and still utilize the favorable evidence
of the witness. It is generally held that where one is deprived of the oppor-
tunity of a complete cross-examination he is entitled to have the testimony
on direct examination stricken from the record.45
If the witness' testimony plus any other evidence contingent thereon is
excluded the defendant's rights are no longer in jeopardy. His right to cross-
examination runs to this evidence. And if the evidence is ruled inadmissible
there is no reason for a required disclosure of the informer's identity. So
too, the prosecution need fail only if the evidence remaining is insufficient
to merit a conviction of the defendant.
An exclusionary rule keeps the court within its judicial limits by
placing the initial burden of choice between the privilege and the evidence
on the government. This is the preferable result as only the government
is in the position to discern whether immediate prosecution is more desirable
than the informer's continued aid to subsequent law enforcement.
44 United States v. Keown, 19 F. Supp. 639, 646 (S.D. Ky. 1937); Priestly v. Superior
Court, 50 Cal.2d 812, 330 P.2d 39 (1958). Unfortunately in both cases the courts used
language which could lead the unsuspecting and not too careful reader to believe that they
were applying a disclosure rule.
4558 Am. JuR. Witnesses § 612 (1948).
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